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Kamil Całus 
Moldova’s political system took shape due to the six-year rule of the Alliance for European 
Integration coalition but it has undergone a major transformation over the past six months. 
Resorting to skilful political manoeuvring and capitalising on his control over the Moldovan 
judiciary system, Vlad Plahotniuc, one of the leaders of the nominally pro-European Democra-
tic Party and the richest person in the country, was able to bring about the arrest of his main 
political competitor, the former prime minister Vlad Filat, in October 2015. Then he pushed 
through the nomination of his trusted aide, Pavel Filip, for prime minister. In effect, Plahot-
niuc has concentrated political and business influence in his own hands on a scale unseen so 
far in Moldova’s history since 1991. All this indicates that he already not only controls the judi-
ciary, the anti-corruption institutions, the Constitutional Court and the economic structures, 
but has also subordinated the greater part of parliament and is rapidly tightening his grip on 
the section of the state apparatus which until recently was influenced by Filat. 
Plahotniuc, whose power and position depends directly on his control of the state apparatus 
and financial flows in Moldova, is not interested in a structural transformation of the country 
or in implementing any thorough reforms; this includes the Association Agreement with the 
EU. This means that as his significance grows, the symbolic actions so far taken with the aim 
of a structural transformation of the country will become even more superficial. Furthermo-
re, the Moldovan government system, which has become monopolised by a single political 
centre, is very unstable. This is so because Plahotniuc’s position is strengthening, while 95% 
of the public declare a dislike of him. Given the arrogant manner in which Plahotniuc’s camp 
took power in the country, all this has rekindled protest sentiments, which are nevertheless 
unlikely to change the political situation in Moldova. It also seems unlikely that this situation 
could be affected by the restrained reactions from Moldova’s Western partners. 
From the alliance of the two oligarchs…
When the Alliance for European Integration took 
power in Moldova in 2009, it kicked off the grad-
ual process of subordinating the state apparatus 
to the leaders of the groupings which formed 
the government coalition (which was nominal-
ly pro-European and implemented the policy of 
EU integration). The key actors and beneficiaries 
of this process were Vlad Filat, the leader of the 
Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM), 
the largest grouping in the coalition, and Vlad 
Plahotniuc, the informal but real leader and 
sponsor of the coalition’s second largest group-
ing, the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM)1. 
1 Plahotniuc’s influence and power are to a great extent 
an effect of his close co-operation with President Vo-
ronin (the leader of the Communist Party) and his son. 
When the Communists lost power, Plahotniuc became 
engaged in promoting his own political project, the 
PDM. Funds offered by Plahotniuc helped the grouping 
enter parliament in July 2009 and become the second 
largest force in the government coalition.
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The two politicians and the third, smallest, 
coalition partner, the Liberal Party (PL) led by 
Mihai Ghimpu, in fact divided influence and 
positions in the country amongst themselves. 
The system formed this way functioned for 
more than 5 years, even though it was very 
unstable and would regularly generate polit-
ical crises. Although Filat and Plahotniuc for-
mally speaking were allies in the coalition, in 
reality they were business and political rivals, 
engaged in a constant struggle for expand-
ing their political influence and control of the 
state apparatus. However, they were forced 
to maintain this temporary alliance which 
ensured them a parliamentary majority and 
enabled them to remain in power and, con-
sequently, to maintain their influence and 
secure their political and business interests2. 
Even though it seemed that both politicians 
remained equally strong, over time it could 
be detected that it was Vlad Plahotniuc who 
had larger assets and greater sway (especial-
ly among the judiciary and partly in the law 
enforcement agencies) and who was more 
successful at limiting the position of his com-
petitor. The fact that Filat was dismissed from 
the position of prime minister as a result of 
the political crisis in 2013 was one sign of this. 
2 For more information on the functioning of the oligar-
chic system focused around Filat and Plahotniuc see: Ka-
mil Całus, A captured state? Moldova’s uncertain pros-
pects for modernisation, OSW Commentary, 22 April 
2015, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-com-
mentary/2015-04-22/appropriated-state-moldovas-un-
certain-prospects-modernisation
… to Plahotniuc’s autocracy 
The turning point which led to the duopoly of 
power breaking took place on 15 October 2015, 
when – upon a motion from the prosecutor 
general, who was believed to be controlled by 
Plahotniuc – Filat was deprived of parliamenta-
ry immunity and was subsequently arrested by 
the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau and sent to 
jail. He was charged with being directly involved 
in siphoning off US$1 billion from the Moldo-
van banking system at the end of 2014 and of 
accepting a bribe of US$250 million from Ilan 
Shor, the Israeli-Moldovan businessman who is 
believed to be the architect of this intrigue. 
Plahotniuc’s influence began to expand rapidly 
after Filat was arrested. He managed to subor-
dinate to himself the greater part of the polit-
ical scene in just three months. The PLDM fell 
apart and became a marginal party, and some 
MPs from this party decided to openly support 
the candidate for prime minister put forward 
by the PDM. There was also an unprecedent-
ed split inside the Communist Party (PCRM) 
– most (14) of its MPs left the party and de-
clared they were willing to co-operate with the 
PDM. It also seems almost certain that Mihai 
Ghimpu’s Liberal Party is at present under Pla-
hotniuc’s strong influence. Many local activists 
and some primars (mayors), predominantly 
from the PLDM, have decided to join the struc-
tures of the PDM. 
Capitalising on his ever stronger control of 
parliament, Plahotniuc made an attempt to 
become prime minister himself. This decision 
contradicted his previous strategy, which had 
included avoiding holding any important posi-
tions in the state administration, instead dele-
gating people who were completely dependent 
on him or were members of his clan to these 
positions. However, the nomination of Plahot-
niuc (despite pressure and alleged blackmail) 
was not accepted by President Nicolae Timof-
ti, who entrusted the former prime minister, 
Ion Sturza, with the mission of forming the 
Vlad Filat and Vlad Plahotniuc, the lead-
ers of the two main groupings in the 
pro-European government coalition, 
were the key figures in the process of the 
appropriation of the state apparatus.
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government on 21 December 2015. Howev-
er, Sturza failed to win a vote of confidence, 
and the Constitutional Court, which was un-
der Plahotniuc’s influence, passed a decision 
restricting the president’s right to nominate 
candidates for prime minister at his discretion3. 
Despite this, Timofti, referring to the Consti-
tutional Court’s decision of 2013 (stating that 
holding senior positions in the state adminis-
tration by individuals of dubious honesty was 
contrary to the law)4, refused to nominate Pla-
hotniuc as a candidate for prime minister for 
the second time, and instead put forward his 
secretary Ion Paduraru as candidate5. However, 
Paduraru withdrew from the mission of form-
ing the government in circumstances which 
are yet to be defined. The PDM put forward 
a compromise candidate, Pavel Filip, Plahot- 
niuc’s close and trusted associate. The president 
accepted this candidate. On 20 January 2016, 
Filip won a vote of confidence in parliament 
and formed a new cabinet. The key positions in 
the new government, including those in charge 
of financial flows and the law enforcement 
3 The decision from the Constitutional Court of the Repub-
lic of Moldova of 29 December 2015 on the nomination 
of Ion Sturza for prime minister, http://www.constcourt.
md/libview.php?l=ro&idc=7&id=735&t=/Prezentare-gener-
ala/Serviciul-de-presa/Noutati/Desemnarea-dlui-Ion-Stur-
za-in-calitate-de-candidat-pentru-functia-de-Prim-minist-
ru-constitutionala-Sesizarea-nr-59a2015
4 Decision from the Constitutional Court of the Repub-
lic of Moldova of 22 April 2013, http://constcourt.md/
libview.php?l=ro&id=428&idc=7&t=/Prezentare-gen-
erala/Serviciul-de-presa/Noutati/Mentinerea-in-func-
tie-a-Prim-ministrului-unui-Guvern-demis-pentru-mo-
tive-de-coruptie-este-neconstitutionala/
5 Mediafax.ro, Ion Păduraru, desemnat premier al Repub-
licii Moldova, 14 January 2016, http://www.mediafax.
ro/externe/ion-paduraru-desemnat-premier-al-repub-
licii-moldova-14965938
agencies, were taken by people linked to Pla-
hotniuc or technocrats with no political base. 
As a result, in addition to the institutions they 
already controlled (the judiciary, anti-corrup-
tion institutions, the National Bank of Moldo-
va (NBM) and the Constitutional Court6), Pla-
hotniuc’s clan gained control of the fiscal and 
customs services (which are a serious source of 
revenue from corruption7) and the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and the police. All state insti-
tutions and the management of state-owned 
companies have undergone an overhaul of per-
sonnel aimed at removing the PLDM’s nomi-
nees and replacing them with people linked to 
Plahotniuc’s clan. Despite public and interna-
tional protests, Plahotniuc’ clan has been tight-
ening their grip on the institutions he already 
controls. One example of this was the re-elec-
tion of Mihai Poalelungi on 7 February 2016 as 
president of the Supreme Court8. At the same 
time, business assets owned by Filat are being 
seized. This process is presented as a way of re-
gaining the funds he had allegedly stolen from 
the Moldovan banking system9. Plahotniuc’s 
influence in the media sector, which is vast al-
ready, is also being expanded (this is described 
in more detail below). 
The pillars of Plahotniuc’s system
Vlad Plahotniuc (born in 1966) is a billionaire 
and simultaneously the most important, the 
most controversial and the most mysterious 
6 A number of decisions passed by the Constitutional Court 
over the past three years proves that this institution has 
been used by Plahotniuc. These decisions enabled him, for 
example, to prevent Vlad Filat from returning to the po-
sition of prime minister in 2013 and to push through the 
nomination of Pavel Filip for the post in January 2016.
7 On 3 February 2016, Eugen Baleca, Plahotniuc’s close 
aide, who had worked for companies linked to him, be-
came the head of the Customs Service. Baleca replaced 
Tudor Balitchi, linked to Vlad Filat.
8 Moldpress.md, Mihai Poalelungi a fost reales preşedinte 
al Curţii Supreme de Justiţie, 9 February 2016, http://
www.moldpres.md/news/2016/02/09/16001079
9 Publika.md, Andrian Candu: Milioanele furate din cele 
trei bănci cu probleme sunt recuperate zilnic, 8 December 
2015, http://www.publika.md/preview_2468661.html
Plahotniuc’s influence began to expand 
rapidly after Filat was arrested in October 
2015. He managed to subordinate to him-
self the greater part of the political scene 
in just three months.
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figure in Moldova’s political and business life. 
He embarked on his career in the 1990s, when 
– according to his official declarations – he 
was engaged predominantly in exporting wine 
to Russia and building a Moldovan-US invest-
ment fund. However, some Moldovan media 
outlets have suggested that pimping and hu-
man trafficking were important sources of his 
income at that time10. This presumed criminal 
activity reportedly helped Plahotniuc to build 
an extensive social network with political and 
business elites not only in Moldova but also in 
Romania and Ukraine. This has also reportedly 
enabled him to blackmail his prominent clients. 
It cannot be ruled out that this was one of the 
reasons why Plahotniuc received a managerial 
position at Petrom Moldova, a subsidiary of the 
Romanian giant, in 2001. His position and influ-
ence helped him to establish close contacts with 
Vladimir Voronin, the then president of Moldo-
va and leader of the Communist Party (which 
ruled the country by itself from 2001-2009) 
and his son, Oleg, one of Moldova’s leading 
businessmen. Allegedly, resorting to blackmail 
and capitalising on his influence inside the state 
structures (the police, fiscal services and judi-
ciary) resulting from his contacts with Voronin, 
Plahotniuc reportedly took over private compa-
nies and destroyed his business competitors11. 
10 Jurnal.md, The show of a puppeteer or the enslavement 
of the political elite from Moldova by the former pimp 
and slave trader Plahotniuc, 3 February 2016, http://jur-
nal.md/en/politic/2016/2/3/the-show-of-a-puppeteer-
or-the-enslavement-of-the-political-elite-from-moldo-
va-by-the-former-pimp-and-slave-trader-plahotniuc/
11 Jurnal.md, Epopeea oligarhului care se visează preşedinte, 
6 January 2015, http://jurnal.md/ro/politic/2015/1/6/epop-
eea-oligarhului-care-se-viseaza-presedinte/
At the same time, he was also building his for-
tune via the irregular privatisation of state prop-
erty. The influence and assets he acquired at that 
time became a foundation on which he was able 
to build his present strength after Voronin relin-
quished power. 
The system of controlling the state apparatus 
and the Moldovan political scene created by 
Plahotniuc is based on four complementary 
main pillars. 
The first one is the clan, the group of Plahotni-
uc’s close aides, many of whom have close kin 
relations with him12 and hold key positions in 
politics and business (usually owing to his pa-
tronage)13. The members of the clan who owe 
their positions to Plahotniuc’s influence include 
the incumbent parliamentary speaker Andrian 
Candu and Prime Minister Pavel Filip.
According to initial information, Plahotniuc’s 
clan is formed of two circles: an inner and ex-
ternal circle. The former is a group of no more 
than a few highly trusted aides who have 
co-operated with Plahotniuc for years and of 
members of his family (including Candu and Fil-
ip). This circle is constant and constitutes the 
core of the clan. The other circle, which is much 
wider, consists of people who co-operate with 
Plahotniuc above all for their own gain and to 
secure their interests. However, Plahotniuc does 
not fully trust this group, and its composition 
may change14. 
The second pillar is that of business and financial 
power. It is estimated that Plahotniuc has assets 
12 According to Moldovan tradition, not only relatives or 
spouses count as close family members, but also god-
children and godparents, wedding witnesses, etc. In the 
case of Moldova, the fact of belonging to a family causes 
a very strong bond and generates obligations that are 
much more serious than those a citizen has with regard to 
the state or state institutions.  
13 It seems that the most important people in Plahotniuc’s clan 
include Andrian Candu (his godson, who serves as the par-
liamentary speaker), Ghenadie Sajin (who has been his aide 
for many years; he manages Finpar Invest, a holding owned 
by Plahotniuc) and Constantin Botnari (the secretary of the 
Democratic Party of Moldova until February 2016).
14 М. Левченко, Влад Плахотнюк: человек в тени, Open-
Democracy, 18 February 2016, https://opendemocracy.
net/od-russia/maria-levenco/chelovek-v-teni
State institutions and the management of 
state-owned companies have undergone 
an overhaul of personnel aimed at removing 
the PLDM’s nominees and replacing them 
with people linked to Plahotniuc’s clan.
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worth around US$2-2.5 billion at his disposal, 
which is a staggering sum of money by Moldo-
van standards (around one third of the country’s 
GDP). His financial capabilities are additionally 
strengthened by his real control of numerous, 
formally state-owned, companies and, since 
Filat has been removed, also of the country’s fi-
nancial flows. The gap in the financial potential 
of Plahotniuc and all the other major political 
and business actors is so vast that, even acting 
together, they would be unable to match him. 
Control of the administration of justice is the 
third pillar of the system. The prosecutor gen-
eral, who held his position until 26 February 
2016, is believed to be controlled by Plahot- 
niuc15, and his predecessor, Valeriu Zubco, was 
probably a member of his clan. There is no 
doubt that the new person holding this func-
tion will also be under his influence. Control 
of the Moldovan judiciary is a key element of 
the Plahotniuc clan’s governance system, since 
it allows the use of the combined ‘carrot and 
stick’ system to subordinate political deci-
sion-makers and business people. According 
to information available, public servants (at 
both the central and local levels), politicians 
and businessmen who are ready to co-operate 
with the Democratic Party of Moldova (which is 
controlled by Plahotniuc) will receive financial 
benefits or promises of impunity from the ju-
diciary, fiscal inspections, etc. However, at the 
same time they are also aware of the fact that 
15 Panorama.md, Дьяков: Генерального прокурора кон-
тролирует Плахотнюк, 4 December 2015, http://www.
pan.md/vlast/dyakov-generalnogo-prokurora-kontroli-
ruet-plahotnyuk-
if they show disobedience, they will not only 
lose what they have gained, they will also have 
to face court proceedings (based on either real 
or fabricated evidence)16. The initiation of court 
proceedings is not the only way to intimidate 
someone-another method is to disclose com-
promising materials17. Furthermore, control of 
this part of the state apparatus allows Plahot-
niuc to secure himself comfortable conditions 
to run and develop his own business, and this 
helps his business position grow18. 
The fourth pillar is control of the greater part 
of the Moldovan press. Plahotniuc currently 
owns four of the five TV stations with nation-
wide coverage and three radio stations, as well 
as a number of newspapers and news portals. 
Furthermore, decisions made by the Moldovan 
Broadcasting Coordinating Council also give 
cause for suspicion that this agency is also un-
der Plahotniuc’s influence. His holding has also 
monopolised practically the entire advertising 
sector. Plahotniuc has thus gained a convenient 
instrument of pressure on the press, which is 
still formally independent and earns money 
mostly from advertising revenue19.
A government system subordinated to a sin-
gle person is very difficult to change. At pres-
ent, there are no political and business circles 
in Moldova that would be able to compete 
16 Radio Chisinau, Valeriu Streleţ: PD a ajuns la putere prin 
diferite scheme de şantaj, 9 February 2016, http://www.
radiochisinau.md/valeriu_strelet_pd_a_ajuns_la_put-
ere_prin_diferite_scheme_de_santaj-30373
17 It is suspected that the video material that was made 
public after Filat’s detention, showing him with his lov-
er, could have commissioned by Plahotniuc. 
18 In November 2014, one of the former directors at the Minis-
try of Internal Affairs, Chiril Motpan, admitted that the Pros-
ecutor General’s Office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
had special lists of companies owned or controlled by Pla-
hotniuc which had to be protected by these institutions: Jur-
nal.md, Colonel în rezervă: ‘Lista firmelor lui Plahotniuc, pe 
masă la PG şi MAI; E interzis să fie atinse’, 27 November 2014, 
http://jurnal.md/ro/social/2014/11/27/colonel-in-rezerva 
-lista-firmelor-lui-plahotniuc-pe-masa-la-pg-si-mai-e-in-
terzis-sa-fie-atinse/
19 Point.md, Михалаке: Плахотнюк владеет 80% реклам-
ного рынка, 25 February 2013, http://point.md/ru/novosti/
politika/mihalake-plahotnyuk-vladeet-80-reklamnogo-rinka 
The system of controlling the state appa-
ratus and the Moldovan political scene 
created by Plahotniuc is based on four 
complementary main pillars.
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with Plahotniuc’s clan. Even if the political 
scene changed radically and, for example, the 
pro-Russian groupings (the Party of Socialists 
led by Igor Dodon, and Our Party led by Re-
nato Usatii) managed to obtain a parliamen-
tary majority, this would not necessarily mean 
that Plahotniuc would be removed from power. 
There are well-grounded suspicions that these 
groupings (especially the Party of Socialists) are 
connected to Plahotniuc. Furthermore, the dis-
proportionately large financial advantage of his 
clan, combined with his control of the judiciary 
and dominance of the media, offer vast oppor-
tunities to influence the shape of the political 
scene and to either create new political parties 
or to discredit existing ones and their leaders. 
The reaction of the Moldovan public to 
the progressing monopolisation of power 
The fact that Vlad Plahotniuc attempted to be-
come prime minister and that his trusted aide, 
Pavel Filip, was finally nominated to this post, 
has radically stoked anti-governmental and 
anti-oligarchic sentiments among the Moldo-
van public. Their outrage has to a great extent 
been provoked by their increasing awareness of 
the fact that power is being monopolised by 
Plahotniuc, who is extremely unpopular (he is 
trusted by 2% of the Moldovan public, while 
95% of them distrust him20) and who is com-
monly) perceived as having been involved in 
the siphoning off of around US$1 billion from 
20 Institutul de Politici Publice, Barometrul Opiniei Publice, 
Noiembrie 2015, http://www.ipp.md/public/files/Baro-
metru/Brosura_BOP_11.2015_prima_parte_final.pdf
the Moldovan banking system. The manner in 
which Plahotniuc made attempts to gain the 
nomination for prime minister (reportedly by 
blackmailing President Timofti, using his influ-
ence inside the Constitutional Court, etc.) addi-
tionally stirred up outrage. 
The establishment of the new government has 
led to a tactical alliance of the two anti-gov-
ernment opposition camps, which are for-
mally ideologically hostile to one another: the 
pro-European camp (where the main role is 
played by the informal Civic Platform Dignity 
and Truth, which was established in February 
2015 by well-known Moldovan social activists, 
publicists and lawyers, and the political party 
originating from it which bears the same name) 
and the pro-Russian camp (the Party of Social-
ists and Our Party). These two groups previ-
ously protested independently of one another 
(two protest tent cities existed from September 
2015: the pro-Russian one in front of the par-
liament building and the pro-European one in 
front of the government headquarters). How-
ever, since 21 January, the leaders of the three 
major opposition forces have occasionally act-
ed together, without displaying the symbols of 
their political parties.
Despite the clearly increasing frustration and 
public mobilisation caused by the recent polit-
ical developments, the effectiveness of the op-
position’s moves is quite limited. The combined 
demonstrations have brought together no 
more than half as many people as those held by 
Dignity and Truth managed to by itself in May 
and September 2015. This is to a great extent 
an effect of the disillusionment of the public 
with the lengthy and ineffective protests. The 
government has disregarded the opposition’s 
demands with impunity, which adds to the 
feeling that the protests are pointless. For many 
months now the media controlled by Plahotni-
uc has been running a campaign aimed at dis-
crediting the opposition (in particular, Dignity 
A system subordinated to Plahotniuc’s 
clan is very difficult to change. At present, 
there are no political and business circles 
in Moldova that would be able to compete 
with its power.
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and Truth), and this has also had an impact21. 
Even though the opposition became tempo-
rarily united against the governing political ar-
rangement, it remains divided not along ideo-
logical lines, but also as regards the methods 
of protest and their demands. The leaders of 
both the pro-European and the pro-Russian 
demonstrators agree on some points, such as 
the need to hold a snap parliamentary election, 
but they disagree on when it should be held. 
There is no doubt that these divisions within 
the opposition (between the pro-European and 
the pro-Russian camps) will continue to grow 
in the coming months due to the preparations 
for the presidential election which – as a result 
of a surprising decision from the Constitutional 
Court of 4 March 201622 – will most likely be 
held in autumn this year. The opposition will 
certainly prove unable to put forward a com-
21 It has been emphasised above all that the Platform is 
an instrument used in the play between Plahotniuc and 
his émigré business opponents: Victor Topa and Viorel 
Topa, and not a representative of public interests. These 
allegations are not completely groundless. The Moldo-
van television station, Jurnal TV, which supports and 
promotes the activity of Dignity and Truth, is owned by 
Victor Topa, and the Platform’s leader, Andrei Nastase, 
served as an attorney for both Victor and Viorel Topa 
during their conflict with Plahotniuc in 2011.
22 On 4 March, the Moldovan Constitutional Court passed 
a decision stating that the constitutional amendment of 
2000 changing the manner of the election of the president, 
from direct into indirect election (the indirect election is 
held by the parliament) was contrary to the constitution. 
Thus the court obliged the government to hold the next 
presidential election according to the new procedure. 
The incumbent president’s term in office ends on 23 
March 2016. For more on the political reasons behind the 
amendment of the constitution see: Kamil Całus, Mołda-
wia: Sąd Konstytucyjny zmienia tryb wyboru prezydenta, 
OSW Analyses, 9 March 2016, http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/
publikacje/analizy/2016-03-09/moldawia-sad-konstytucy-
jny-zmienia-tryb-wyboru-prezydenta
mon candidate. Schisms may be expected in-
side both camps, especially between the Party 
of Socialists and Our Party. Relations between 
these two groupings are already tense (given 
the fact that they are vying for the same elec-
torate), but they most likely will become even 
more tense due to fact that Renato Usatii, the 
leader of Our Party, will not be eligible to run 
for the presidency because of his age (he is 37, 
while the required minimum age is 40)23. 
Another very important factor limiting the scale 
of the opposition’s activity is the fact that the 
demonstrators, despite high frustration lev-
els, are painstakingly trying to avoid a violent 
scenario and bloodshed. The PCRM’s victory 
in the parliamentary election brought in April 
2009 led to riots, during which several people 
were killed and many were injured; the trauma 
connected to this incident is still alive among 
the Moldovan public. Both this memory and 
the serious concern that the Ukrainian Maidan 
scenario could be repeated in Moldova (and, 
in effect, the fear of a Russian intervention) 
play their part in making the violent scenario 
less likely. The government is perfectly aware 
of this and has definitely refrained from using 
any violent solutions so as in order to avoid pro-
voking the demonstrators. However, it has in-
stead threatened that court proceedings will be 
launched against demonstrators who break the 
law. This intimidates the protesters and discour-
ages potential participants from taking part in 
the protests. 
Possible developments
The future of Vlad Plahotniuc’s monopolist po-
sition is currently uncertain. His position could 
23 The issue of the age census of candidates for president 
further proof that the Moldovan Constitutional Court has 
been politicised. In its decision of 4 March 2016, the court 
ruled that the original version of the article concerning the 
presidential election be reinstated, with the exception of 
the part setting the age census, which in the version before 
the amendment was 35 years. This amendment prevented 
Renato Usatii from running for the presidency. 
Despite the clearly increasing frustration 
and public mobilisation caused by the 
recent political developments, the effec-
tiveness of the opposition’s moves is quite 
limited.
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be challenged, for example, by the activity of 
the anti-government opposition and the de-
teriorating economic situation. Although the 
protests are at present limited, it should not be 
ruled out that there could be an escalation of 
tension or even provocation, and this may lead 
as far as the collapse of the present cabinet and 
a snap parliamentary election. Paradoxically, 
the present political deal will benefit from the 
new procedure of electing the president which 
was introduced as a result of the Constitutional 
Court’s decision in March this year (by gener-
al election instead of election by parliament). 
Even if it prevents Plahotniuc from installing 
a close aide in this position (and this is his in-
tention, beyond any doubt), it will still remove 
the risk of a snap parliamentary election which 
might be scheduled if Plahotniuc was unable to 
get the 3/5 majority of MPs’ votes needed to 
elect the president (this was required under the 
version of the constitution invalidated by the 
court’s decision). At present, Plahotniuc has 56-
58 votes, and it appears that the main reason 
that brought about the change of the election 
system was the fact that he had problems com-
manding the required majority. Additionally, 
the court’s decision postpones the time of elec-
tion of the president from May this year to au-
tumn, and this gives the government more than 
six months to improve its image in the eyes of 
the public and to promote its own candidate 
for president (by using its control of the state 
apparatus and the powerful media complex). 
The new government, aware of its lack of pop-
ularity and the vast public dissatisfaction, is 
currently focusing on actions that could quickly 
improve its image. Since 1 February 2016, gas 
prices have been reduced by around 10%, the 
distribution of cheap (‘welfare’) bread was re-
introduced and government inspections of 
companies have been temporarily withheld. 
It has also been promised to raise pensions 
and reduce electricity prices (in both cases by 
10%). The government has also made intensive 
efforts to bring back EU financing which was 
suspended in summer 2015, to renew the loan 
talks with the IMF and to receive a loan of 150 
million euros promised by Bucharest last year. 
On 2 March, due to the non-transparent own-
ership structure and accusations of conspira-
cy, the NBM froze around 40% of the shares 
of Moldova Agroindbank, one of the country’s 
largest banks, and dismissed two vice pres-
idents of Moldindconbank24. In turn, the par-
liament passed a number of laws intended, for 
example, at reforming the prosecution author-
ities and the NBM and at demonopolising the 
media. However, nothing seems to suggest that 
these reforms would really change the existing 
government system. At the same time, moves 
have been made to prove to the public how 
the new government is engaged in combating 
corruption. It is also suggested that Filat and 
the PLDM were the main sources of corruption 
in Moldova, and that it has only become possi-
ble to combat it since they were removed from 
power. These moves are accompanied by a very 
intensive PR campaign in the media owned by 
Plahotniuc.
If the government manages to stabilise the eco-
nomic situation in the country and to remain 
24 The NBM has taken two-level action in the banking 
sector. On the one hand, its moves will have a positive 
effect on the government’s image (both at home and 
abroad), since they demonstrate its will to combat the 
pathologies in the country’s financial system. However, 
on the other hand, they are in fact aimed at taking care 
of Plahotniuc’s interests. Both of the banks which the 
NBM has recently taken measures against are most likely 
controlled (using a non-transparent and dispersed sys-
tem of shareholders) by Veaceslav Platon, a Moldovan 
millionaire who is in conflict with Plahotniuc. 
It cannot be ruled out that if the govern-
ment system based on Plahotniuc’s clan 
becomes stronger, this may lead to the 
formation of a specific kind of soft, nom-
inally pro-European authoritarianism in 
Moldova.
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in power for the next few months despite the 
social tension, it cannot be ruled out that it will 
begin to gain popularity. In effect, the govern-
ment system based on Plahotniuc’s clan which 
has crystallised over the past six months will 
grow even stronger and expand its influence 
still further. This may lead to the formation of 
a specific kind of soft, nominally pro-European 
authoritarianism, where both the parliament 
and the government will become fully margin-
alised, deprived of independence (this process 
can already be observed25) and will only play 
the role of executive institutions adding legiti-
macy to the real power centre, i.e. Plahotniuc’s 
clan. In this situation, the chances for pro-Euro-
25 One clear proof of this is the practice of passing new 
laws, quickly and without any discussion, which has 
been observed over the past few months in the Moldo-
van parliament. 
pean changes in Moldova and a genuine imple-
mentation of the Association Agreement will 
be rather distant. Possible reforms will most 
likely be limited to the minimum necessary to 
maintain the dialogue with the EU, and thus to 
legitimise the present government. 
Moscow would benefit from Plahotniuc keep-
ing power, since this will block any real en-
hancement of Moldova’s integration with 
Western structures, and at the same time will 
not require any financial engagement from 
the Russian side (which would be necessary, if 
pro-Russian forces took power). Furthermore, 
the operation of this system will be a conve-
nient propaganda instrument for the Kremlin 
in discrediting the idea of European integration 
and the effectiveness of the EU’s policy with re-
gard to its Eastern Partners. 
